SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF KINGS: CRIMINAL TERM: PART 4

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

- against-

:Indict no.

2585/96

JABBAR WASHINGTON,

Defendant.

:

320 Jay Street Brooklyn, New York

July 12, 2017

BEFORE:

HONORABLE MATTHEW J. D'EMIC,
Justice

APPEARANCES:

OFFICE OF ERIC GONZALEZ, ESQ.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, KINGS COUNTY
350 Jay Street

Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201

BY: MARK HALE, ESQ.

Assistant District Attorney

THE LAW OFFICE OF RONALD L. KUBY

Attorney for the Defendant

119 West 23rd Street, Suite 900

New York, N.Y. 10011

BY: RONALD KUBY, ESQ.

JOYCE MANZA SENIOR COURT REPORTER

THE CLERK: This is number ten on the Part Four calendar, indictment 2585 of 1996, People of the State of New York versus Jabbar Washington.

Appearances, please.

MR. KUBY: Ronald Kuby, K-U-B-Y, 119 West
23rd Street, New York, New York, Twitter @occupyKuby, for
the defendant Jabbar Washington.

Good afternoon, Judge.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. HALE: Office of the District Attorney by Mark Hale.

Good afternoon, Judge.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Yes.

MR. KUBY: Pursuant to discussions with the Office of the District Attorney, I am making an oral motion pursuant to 440.10, subsection one, subsections C, D and G, to vacate the judgment of conviction. According to my discussion with both Mr. Hale and District Attorney Gonzalez, they will be joining the motion insofar as section — sub-subsection D applies.

MR. HALE: That is correct, Your Honor.

Mr. Gonzalez, the acting District Attorney, has authorized me to join in that motion as to subsection 1D, alleging a constitutional violation, which deprived Mr. Washington of his due process rights, and resulted in

1 a wrongful conviction.

If I may, Your Honor, state the reasons.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HALE: Jabbar Washington was accused, arrested for and convicted of felony murder for the January 1995 push-in burglary/robbery by a group of heavily armed and masked men of an apartment in Brownsville, Brooklyn, from which crack cocaine was sold and consumed. In the course of the robbery, at least two of the armed assailants opened fire on the apartment's occupants, wounding five, one of them fatally, a man by the name of Ronald Ellis.

Six other individuals, in addition to

Mr. Washington, were also arrested, as part of the group

of assailants, all of whom were convicted by jury verdict

or guilty plea of the robbery shooting and have served or

are still serving custodial sentences. With reference to

the other individuals, the Conviction Review Unit sees no

reason to disturb their respective convictions.

This one with Mr. Washington, being unique in its facts, however, with regard to Mr. Washington, the Conviction Review Unit has uncovered gross due process violations, which mandate vacatur of the conviction, a recommendation in which Mr. Gonzalez joined and will now move to vacate the conviction.

First and foremost the violations consist of

non-disclosure of critical Brady information. When the arrest of Mr. Washington was authorized, the evidence against Mr. Washington purportedly consisted of a confessional statement to Detective Louis Scarcella and his partner who were working on the case because the assigned detectives were otherwise unavailable. And a positive lineup hit by one of the victims of the crime, a woman by the name of Lisa Todd. The lineup also being conducted by Detectives Scarcella and Chmil, his partner.

At the Grand Jury, which occurred two days after the arrest and the lineup, Ms. Todd appeared for her testimony. At that time she disputed the detectives' account of the lineup, which was conducted again two days before, saying that she had never identified Mr. Washington as a perpetrator, but just someone that she knew from the building.

The Grand Jury Assistant made note of the recantation, Ms. Todd did not testify at that time to identify Mr. Washington as a perpetrator and, in fact, never did throughout the course of this prosecution.

The Grand Jury assistant, as I said, made note of that, but never-the-less -- and this note was made on what's called the Grand Jury Synopses Sheet.

Never-the-less, that Grand Jury Assistant also filled out the notice of identification and the voluntarily

disclosure form, again noting that there was no Brady material, despite the fact that this recantation had been made.

Furthermore, in the motions that were filed by the defendant in this case, in answer to those motions, the People again answered that there was no known Brady material, again, not disclosing that Ms. Todd, you know, would not, could not and never would identify Mr. Washington as a perpetrator, of which they had that information at that time.

There was no mention at all of the disputed nature of what the witness that identified the defendant as being and doing, made no mention at all about the notation and never turned it over. The People see this and CRU saw this as an intentional withholding of that particular information to put the defense at a disadvantage in terms of the trial. There was no reasonable explanation for withholding that information at that time.

Never-the-less, the People again proceeded through a pretrial hearing, which was ordered by the Court, a pretrial Wade hearing, in which only the detectives testified, the witness was not called to testify, again alleging that this lineup procedure had occurred, without resolving the dispute about what was actually said.

It's the People's position, CRU believes that had this disclosure been made, then the testimony concerning the lineup identification would have either been suppressed or precluded or the People would have withdrawn their notice and probably what they should have done. That again was not done.

Not only did the defendant, without that information, was forced or compelled to use time and energy conducting an unnecessary hearing, but it also severely prejudiced, in CRU's view, their preparation for the trial that was to come.

Now, the prosecution at trial went further by questioning Ms. Todd in her direct examination as if she were an identifying witness. In other words, they went through all of the procedures and steps that led up to the lineup, asking her about whether she went to the precinct, how she was contacted to go to the precinct, where she stayed at the precinct, what it was she was instructed to do in terms of looking at the lineup, what she saw in the lineup, six individuals holding numbers, and finally elicited from her that she did, in fact, recognize somebody in the lineup. This was done without explanation at all as to the fact that she did not identify him as a non-perpetrator. It was left up to cross examination and the defense attorney asking

Ms. Todd, "Are you saying that this fellow was a perpetrator in the crime," and to which she said, "No."

To which she said, "No."

It's CRU's opinion that this examination was intended to give the impression, to imply to the jury to do, in a backdoor sort of way, the impression that she had, in fact, made an identification of the defendant as a perpetrator in the lineup. And, in fact, getting in indirectly what they could not do directly.

And the law is very clear about that, that if there's not going to be an in-court identification, then there's no reason to be able to imply that there was an out-of-court identification.

The People vouch for their witness's truth telling.

If she said he was not a perpetrator in the crime, that's over and done with.

It is the opinion of CRU that this was done intentionally to give that impression to the jury to get evidence in which would not otherwise be admissible.

Same thing occurred during the questioning of Detective Scarcella. On direct examination again, Detective Scarcella was led through all the steps of setting up the lineup, even though at this point this testimony is completely irrelevant.

Now, defense counsel at trial did not make

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objections to any of this material coming in, but again, it set up the whole thing. What did you do, Detective Scarcella? We then gathered fillers, we gave the defendant his choice of where to sit in the lineup. We assigned the numbers in the lineup. This is what we asked the witness, everything except eliciting the actual identification.

And again, the defendant, not having the information about where and when Ms. Todd had refuted or recanted her identification, was not able to examine, to judge the credibility of Detective Scarcella. Again, this was setting up, again, getting in this evidence indirectly which they could not do directly. And CRU believes intentionally so.

It also set up an error that came thereafter. When Detective Scarcella was being cross-examined by defense counsel, he was asked, "Was getting a confession of particular importance in this case?" Now that question calls for a yes or no answer. Scarcella answered, and not entirely responsively, and CRU believes intentionally, "If he didn't get ID'd, it would have." Again, received without objection. The Court, having ruled that the defendant opened the door by this statement. CRU does not necessarily agree because the statement appears to be nonresponsive to the question.

And again, CRU believes that this was intentionally and improperly done to inject what Detective Scarcella believed that the witness's testimony should have been or what he comported with. But, as you know, the law requires that the prosecution and the police can't have it both ways. They can't have it both ways.

You can't put a witness on the stand who you vouch for as testifying credibly and truthfully, who says that she did not identify him as a perpetrator and then bring up that she did, in fact, identify him as a perpetrator. You simply can't have it both ways.

Now, this was compounded by the Court at that time making, what the People believed, to be a very egregious error. He took over the questioning at that point in time and actually asked Detective Scarcella to read the notes of what it was purported that Ms. Todd had said during the lineup, to the effect that the defendant, number three he was holding in the lineup, he was one of the perpetrators, he had a gun, he spoke during the robbery. And so — and he did so doing that and failed to give any instruction as how the jury was to consider this evidence. Clearly the jury could not consider it as evidence in chief that she had, in fact, made an identification.

They should have -- and it was not requested, there

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was no objection to it. The Court should have instructed the jury that they could only use, in terms of judging the credibility of the witness, both the witness on the stand Scarcella and the witness testifying Ms. Todd, about who they were talking about. Because they did not have this instruction, there is a very real possibility, that CRU cannot dispute, that the jury used this as evidence in chief that she had, in fact, made an identification of the defendant as a perpetrator and that that contributed to his conviction, in addition to the other inculpatory evidence.

Now, the only inculpatory evidence really at the trial was, in fact, the defendant's statement. The defense at trial — and the defendant took the stand — was that the detective had fed him the information in the statement, had coerced him to make the statement, that Miranda came late, if at all, and that these were not his words, that he was, in fact, innocent. And that really becomes the key point on which the People are moving to vacate or are joining in the motion to vacate this particular conviction.

Because that key was the credibility of the detectives who worked on the case, in terms of their saying yes, he made this inculpatory statement, which was contested. Without resolving this issue as to what it

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was or what was not said by Ms. Todd during the lineup, the jury again, could not adequately assess the credibility of the detective.

In other words, if Ms. Todd -- if that testimony had been developed, once the door was opened, or if it had chosen to be gone through by the defense attorney, that Ms. Todd had said, hey, Detective Scarcella put those words in my mouth or those are not my words, he entirely fabricated it, I just identified him as an individual that I knew and not as a perpetrator, then that would have perhaps dovetailed with the defense that, in fact, the defendant was saying that Detective Scarcella had fabricated his statement, had put words in his mouth. But this was left unresolved during the course of the trial.

There were other violations, which did occur during the course of the trial, which would mandate vacatur, despite this issue about the lineup and the contested nature of it.

During the cross examination of the defendant -- as I mentioned, the defendant took the stand. The trial prosecutor made a clear Bruton violation by asking the defendant whether he was told by the interviewing detectives that one of the codefendants had given him up or had included him in the robbery/burglary. Clearly

that was improper, would have mandated reversal on its own.

The prosecutor went further again, another statement was made during the course of the trial, another question that was put by the prosecutor to Mr. Washington was,

"Can you think of a reason why Lisa Todd would frame you for this particular crime for murder?" And, in fact,

Lisa Todd had not done so. Had not done so. There was no good faith basis for asking him that question. It was highly prejudicial. That, in and of itself, we believe, would have mandated reversal. Again, these questions were not objected to, they were not preserved for appeal.

The prosecutor went further asking the defendant whether he was told, during the course of his interrogation, about each and every one of the other codefendants, whether he was told that they had been convicted for the crime. Again, wholly improper.

Now, looking at those statements, the cross-examining questions, either singularly or all together, CRU believes that that would have been enough to mandate vacatur of this conviction. There's a lot of — perhaps blame is maybe the wrong word, but responsibility that goes around on that. Certainly past the prosecutor asking the questions, it also goes to the defense attorney not objecting to those questions, it

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goes to the Court not intervening concerning those questions, which were obviously impermissible, and the appellate attorney not raising those as part of the appeal process.

Therefore, in his appeal, Mr. Washington, whose appellate attorney only cited summation errors made by the prosecutor, did not really get to the heart of a lot of things which would have mandated reversal.

But the central issue really is this credibility question with regard to Ms. Todd. CRU believes that the defense attorney, while he did not do a great job in combating what was prosecutorial misconduct by the trial prosecutor, also was not equipped with the Brady material, which pretrial, could have obviated all of this by having a motion in limine to preclude any mention about a lineup whatsoever and a identification whatsoever. And this he failed to do.

The problem then becomes, since this is the basis of our vacatur, is a what to do with the remainder of the indictment. It is the position of CRU and the recommendations of the District Attorney Mr. Gonzalez that we cannot perpetuate her testimony, the testimony of Ms. Todd because she's now deceased. She herself was the victim of a homicide in 2006. Since this question would be irresolved at the time as to what was said during this

lineup identification and is now irresolvable at the time of, since her demise, then we cannot retry Mr. Washington in a way which comports with due process and the right to confrontation on this particular question.

So in that regard, Your Honor, the People not only acquiesce to the vacatur of the conviction under the subsection that was mentioned, we would also move to dismiss the indictment, in the interest of justice, and ask the Court to discharge the defendant.

THE COURT: Mr. Kuby.

MR. KUBY: If I may, and I will be brief, at least brief for me. Last time Mr. Washington was in court on April 14th, 1997, when then Justice Pincus, giving him a sentence of 25 to life, said his parole officer quote "hadn't been born yet." And that turned out to be sort of the one true thing that was said to him in the course of the trial.

We have spent a tremendous amount of time and energy and ink and argument and papers over the role that Detective Scarcella did or did not play in this case, other cases. I just want to note, for clarity purposes, the only person who said Lisa Todd identified Jabbar Washington was Detective Scarcella.

Lisa Todd herself, the first time she was asked by somebody who was not Louie Scarcella, and that was before

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her Grand Jury presentation in this case, Lisa Todd
herself said, "No, I never said that. I only knew him
from the building." Which of course she did because he
lived in the building.

You know, for purposes of this hearing, you know,
Detective Scarcella is like the Lieutenant William Calley
of the 1980s or 1990s of New York City policing, yeah, he
pulled the trigger, he fired the bullets, but other
people gave him the gun, they gave him the ammunition,
and they didn't much care who he hit.

And what's important in this case more than any of the other cases I've worked on is that District Attorney Gonzalez and the Conviction Review Unit and Mark Hale have made it explicit that this conviction was the process of an institutional failure. The Assistant District Attorney Kyle Reeves was the principal villain here and I duly note that he has been fumigated out of K.C.D.A. sometime ago, but he wasn't the only one.

There were a total of six Assistant District

Attorneys who knew or should have known this. There were at least two judges who knew it or should have known it or should have made some inquiry, not to mention the appellate court justices and just so I'm not leaving out defense counsel, in all fairness.

It is true that defense counsel in this case

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blundered into a minefield without a map. A minefield that had been laid by Detective Scarcella and A.D.A. Kyle Reeves, but once the first mine went off, once the first explosion occurred, defense counsel, instead of sort of backing up, decided to plow right ahead. And in three pages of utter cringe-worthy testimony, he probably did more to hurt his client than any other single witness did in the course of the case.

And the problem with institutional problems is they need institutional solutions. And D.A. Thompson began that process, that institutional process by creating a real CRU, with real lawyers and real staffing and real resources and District Attorney Gonzalez has continued that. And has also helped to maintain a different culture that I have not seen before.

About a year ago, a client -- I was working on a case with him in the CRU. And he said to me, "Do you trust D.A. Gonzalez?" And I said, "Well, do I trust him to see things as I see them? No. But I do trust him that if his unit finds a document, finds evidence, I totally trust the fact that it will be turned over to us." And indeed, it was.

And sort of the back story in this case is that one little document, that little Grand Jury Synopses Sheet -- I never even heard of a Grand Jury Synopses Sheet -- way

in the bottom of a box somewhere in one of those manila folders, probably with a little coffee stain ring around it, the way they get when you are looking at papers, that one little document that nobody turned over to the defense, was discovered by then Assistant District Attorney Jessica Wilson, who promptly turned it over to the defense. And while, as you have heard from Brother Hale there were a lot of things wrong with this case from beginning to end, it was that document that was sort of the fulcrum on which the seesaw of justice moved and so I commend them for doing that.

And I commend District Attorney Gonzalez for his personal involvement in this case, not just the institutional involvement, but his personal involvement in expediting this case as fast as it could be expedited.

And, you know, we're on the cusp of Mr. Washington's release and I know -- I know it is not an academy award ceremony, I'm not, you know, thanking my mom and my dad, but I just want to note that there are three people, none of them have law degrees, none of them work for law enforcement and none of them were journalists, who are probably more responsible for the moment we are in now than any other three people. And they were three people who began their own innocence clinic project in prison. Two of them are here today. They have both been

exonerated, one by the D.A.'s Office, one by a judge.

Derrick Hamilton, Shabaka Shakur. Third, Danny Rincon,
who was not convicted here, but was convicted, who is
also a third member of that project.

And these were the three men who took the time and the care and the energy, the people who had the fewest resources, financially and educationally, were the ones who began the unraveling of the Scarcella misconduct, which led to so many other things.

So as Jabbar Washington will walk out of this courtroom today, he does walk out on the shoulders of the men who have worked so hard before him. And I certainly join in Brother Hale's motion to dismiss the charges.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. HALE: That's it.

THE COURT: Okay. So then, based upon the record made before me this afternoon, the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction is granted.

And upon the People's further representation that the constitutional violations cited today can no longer be resolved and, therefore, the recommendation that the indictment be dismissed in the interest of justice, based upon that record, is granted.

MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.

If I could have Mr. Washington uncuffed.

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1	THE COURT: Could I talk to counsel for one second
2	MR. KUBY: Yes, Judge.
3	(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
4	(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)
5	* * * * *
6	Certified to be a true and accurate transcript of the
7	foregoing proceedings.
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10	Joyce Manza
11	JOYCE MANZA
12	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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